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Family Law.  Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221 (R.I. 2019).  For the 
purposes of calculating child support obligations, the undistributed 
pass-through income of an S corporation is not automatically 
included in a parent’s gross income.  If a court finds that S 
corporation distributions are used to pay for a parent’s personal 
debts, however, those funds are included in a parent’s gross income 
for the purposes of calculating child support obligations.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Joel and Denise Trojan married in July 1990.1  In March 2014, 
Joel filed for divorce citing irreconcilable differences; Denise filed a 
counterclaim seeking child support for their minor child Tiffany.2  
On the first day of trial, Joel and Denise entered into a consent 
order in which they agreed upon joint custody of Tiffany, Joel was 
awarded all reasonable rights of parenting time, the marital estate 
was divided equally, and neither party would address the conduct 
or fault of the other in connection with the court’s consideration of 
equitable distribution and alimony.3  
That same day, Denise moved for temporary allowances, 
claiming that during the course of the divorce the parties had 
shared a joint marital account from which Denise had supported 
herself and Tiffany.4  Denise alleged that the account was depleted 
and Joel had stopped depositing money into the account 
approximately one month before the trial began.5  Denise argued 
that Joel was earning $1.8 million per year and, pursuant to the 
child support guidelines worksheet, she would be entitled to 
1. Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 224 (R.I. 2019).  Consistent with the
Court’s opinion, Joel Trojan, Denise Trojan, John Trojan, and Tiffany Trojan 
will be referred to by their first names. 
2. Id.  To protect the anonymity of the minor child, the court assigned her
a pseudonym.  Id. at 223. 
3. Id. at 224.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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$16,000 per month in child support.6  Joel responded by arguing 
that there was “at least a million dollars” in the joint account when 
the parties agreed to divide the account equally, and as a result 
Denise received $505,000 around the same time that she filed for 
temporary allowances.7  Additionally, Joel argued that Denise’s 
calculation of his earnings was incorrect because it included “pass-
through income that he received from Century Drywall, Inc. 
(Century), an S corporation of which Joel was the sole 
shareholder.”8  Denise chose to pursue child support in the amount 
of $16,000 per month because, according to Denise, Joel was 
receiving distributions in addition to a salary from Century.9 
Thereafter, Denise’s counsel conceded, “the child doesn’t need 
[$]16,000 a month,” and the trial justice concluded that he was “not 
going to entertain a motion for temporary allowances in 
anticipation of the divorce hearing[,]” but rather “hear it all at the 
same time[,]” and that he would consider awarding retroactive child 
support if necessary.10  Accordingly, Joel voluntarily paid Denise 
$2,444 per month in child support from January 2016 until final 
judgment was entered in December 2016.11  In August 2016, a 
decision pending entry of final judgment was entered, which 
incorporated, but did not merge, the marital settlement agreement 
and continued the child support issue, to which neither party 
sought review.12 
Subsequently, at the child support hearing later that year, the 
court heard testimony from Joel, Denise, and Justin Amico, CPA, 
who was the accountant for Century and also prepared the parties’ 
personal income tax returns.13  Mr. Amico testified that Century 
retained its profits from December 31, 2013 through December 31, 
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.  Century originally had three shareholders: Joel Trojan, his brother 
John, and his brother-in-law Michael Elliott.  Id. at 225.  By December 2013, 
Joel had purchased the interests of both John and Mr. Elliott, becoming the 
sole shareholder.  Id. 
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2015, which increased shareholder equity.14  Mr. Amico also 
testified that Alliant Insurance Services, Inc., a bonding company, 
required that Century increase its equity to $10 million in order to 
receive bonds.15  Additionally, Mr. Amico testified that, in his 
opinion, compliance with this requirement was a “legitimate 
business interest because there was a risk that [Century] would not 
be able to secure bonds as it bid on future work if it was 
undercapitalized.”16  Lastly, Mr. Amico testified that in 2015, 
Century had $2,692,793 in net income, of which $1,641,150 was 
distributed to Joel.17  
Joel then testified that Denise had received $2,725,660 in cash 
from him, in addition to an interest in various bank accounts, 
brokerage accounts, real estate, and other investments.18  Joel also 
testified that since Denise moved for temporary allowances, he had 
begun to make voluntary monthly child support payments in the 
amount of $2,444 per month.19  Joel arrived at the $2,444 figure by 
completing a child support guideline worksheet based on his 2015 
wages and taxable interest.20 
Denise then took the witness stand and provided the court with 
a list of expenses that she alleged were necessary to maintain 
Tiffany’s lifestyle.21  These expenses included: 
$700 to $800 per month to spend at the mall and for other 
activities with her friends; $575 every four to six weeks for 
hair extension maintenance; over $200 per month for hair 
products; $275 per month on manicures, pedicures, and 
acrylic nails; $150 to $200 every two weeks on cosmetics; 
$150 to $200 per month on foot reflexology and massages; 
between $10,000 to $11,000 per year for vacations, 
14. Id.  Mr. Amico testified that as of December 31, 2014, Century’s total
stockholder equity was $7,310,276 and, according to an “Equity Rollforward 
Sheet,” by the close of 2015 stockholder equity had increased to $8,361,919.  Id.  
15. Id. at 225–26.
16. Id. at 226.
17. Id.  Joel used the distributions to pay taxes on the corporation’s net
income, the note payment obligations to John and to Mr. Elliott, and a 
premium on his life insurance policy.  Id.  
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 226–27.
21. Id. at 227.
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including the cost of bringing one of Tiffany’s friends along; 
$425 per month on clothing and shoes; and $150 per month 
for functions attended by Tiffany.22  
The trial justice found that these expenses were “not only 
incredulous, but outrageous in some fashion, concerning hair 
extensions, acrylic nails, foot reflexology, the clothing amount per 
month, and a number of other expenses.”23  Additionally, the trial 
justice found that Joel’s gross salary for 2015 was $278,344, and 
that Joel was the sole shareholder of Century, and as such, 
Century’s 2015 income of $1,051,643 was retained for a legitimate 
business reason and not to shield or manipulate Joel’s income to 
reduce his child support obligation.24  The trial justice relied upon 
Mr. Amico’s testimony, finding it to be “uncontradicted” and “very 
informative and quite credible[.]”25  
Ultimately, the trial justice found that Century’s total 
distributions to Joel in 2015 “did not inure to Joel’s benefit,” and 
should not be included as part of Joel’s gross income calculation for 
child support purposes because they “had not been dispensed to 
enhance Joel’s lifestyle since the year 2011.”26  Final judgment was 
entered on December 28, 2016, and on that same day, Denise timely 
appealed the trial justice’s child support calculations to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court (the Court).27 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, Denise argued that because the trial justice 
“misinterpret[ed] and disregard[ed] the formula set forth in the R.I. 
Child Support Guidelines,” the child support issue was therefore a 
22. Id.
23. Id. at 228.  The trial justice admittedly endorsed theories advanced in
Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. App. Ct. 2001), where the appellate 
court held “[b]eyond a certain point, additional child support serves no purpose 
but to provide extravagance and an unwarranted transfer of wealth.”  Id. at 
456. The appellate court recognized this reasoning is referred to as the “Three
Pony Rule,” that is, “no child, no matter how wealthy the parents, needs to be
provided more than three ponies.”  Id. (citing Matter of Marriage of Patterson,
920 P.2d 450, 455 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996)).
24. Trojan, 208 A.3d at 227.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 227–28.
27. Id. at 228–29.
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question of law, subject to de novo review.28  The Court disagreed, 
noting that “[i]t is well established that the appropriate award of 
child support is to be determined by the trial justice in his or her 
sound discretion, and we shall not disturb such a determination on 
review absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”29  Additionally, 
Denise argued that the trial justice’s decision did not comport with 
Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-16.2(a)30 by failing to 
order interim child support while the divorce was pending, and also 
that the trial justice erroneously calculated Joel’s child support 
obligation by failing to include Century’s distributions in Joel’s 
gross income.31  
As for the interim child support, Denise argued that the trial 
justice did not adhere to section 15-5-16.2 because he did not 
formally award any child support until one year after Denise had 
requested interim support.32  Furthermore, Denise argued that the 
trial justice erred when he “prematurely and peremptorily denied 
28. Id. at 229.
29. Id. (quoting Mattera v. Mattera, 669 A.2d 538, 542 (R.I. 1996)).
30. 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2(a) states:
(a) In a proceeding for divorce, divorce from bed and board, a
miscellaneous petition without the filing of divorce proceedings, or
child support, the court shall order either or both parents owing a duty
of support to a child to pay an amount based upon a formula and
guidelines adopted by an administrative order of the family court. If,
after calculating support based upon court established formula and
guidelines, the court, in its discretion, finds the order would be
inequitable to the child or either parent, the court shall make findings
of fact and shall order either or both parents owing a duty of support
to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for the child’s support after
considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(1) The financial resources of the child;
(2) The financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the
marriage not been dissolved;
(4) The physical and emotional condition of the child and his or her
educational needs; and
(5) The financial resources and needs of the non-custodial parent,
provided, that in establishing a child-support order, incarceration
may not be treated as voluntary unemployment.
31. Trojan, 208 A.3d at 229.
32. Id.  Denise argued that the trial justice should have awarded interim
child support on two occasions; first, on December 16, 2015 (the first day of 
trial), and on July 26, 2016, the day the marital settlement was entered.  Id.  
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her request for $16,000 per month in child support without first 
calculating child support under the guidelines.”33  The Court held 
that the trial justice acted “well within the bounds of his discretion” 
in not awarding interim child support, and pointed to Denise’s 
counsel’s own admission that Tiffany did not require $16,000 per 
month in child support.34  Moreover, Denise’s counsel 
acknowledged that Denise had been supporting herself and Tiffany 
with the funds from the joint marital account, which she received 
just one week prior to her request.35  The Court then held that 
Denise had waived her appeal by not raising the issue again at the 
hearing on July 26, 2016.36 
The Court next examined Denise’s argument that Century’s 
net income and distributions should have been included in Joel’s 
gross income for calculating child support obligations.37  The Court 
noted that, at first glance, the child support guidelines appear to 
require that all sources of income, whether earned or unearned, 
should be included as part of a parent’s gross income for purposes 
of calculating child support obligations.38  The Court explained, 
however, that Family Court Administrative Order No. 12-0539 
requires the trial justice to conduct a “careful[] review” of the 
expenses and income of a business to determine the appropriate 
amount of gross income actually available to the parent to satisfy a 
child support obligation.40  The Court held that the trial justice 
33. Id. at 230.
34. Id.
35. Id.  Denise had received approximately $505,000 from the joint marital 
account.  Id. 
36. Id.
37. Id. at 231.
38. Id. at 232.
39. Administrative Order No. 12-05 states:
For purposes of these guidelines, “income” is defined as actual gross 
income of the parent, if employed to full capacity or potential income 
if unemployed or underemployed.  Gross income includes, but is not 
limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, 
dividends, severance pay, pensions, interests, trust income, annuities, 
capital gains, social security benefits, worker’s compensation benefits, 
gifts, prizes, and alimony or maintenance received, and all other forms 
of earned/unearned income. Specifically excluded are benefits 
received from means-tested public assistance programs. 
Id. 
40. Id.
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conducted a “careful[] review,” and noted that here, the trial justice 
looked beyond Joel’s tax returns and heard an “abundance of 
testimony from Mr. Amico” before concluding that Century’s net 
income and distributions to Joel should not have been included into 
Joel’s gross income calculation.41  
Denise then argued that because Joel was the sole shareholder 
of Century, 100% of Century’s 2015 net income should be included 
in Joel’s 2015 gross income for the purposes of calculating child 
support obligations, and therefore the trial justice erred in 
excluding Century’s net income from Joel’s gross income even 
though it was listed on Joel’s W-2 form.42  The Court affirmed the 
trial justice’s reliance on a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
case, J.S. v. C.C., which held that “pass-through earnings” from a 
closely held S corporation should not automatically be included, but 
rather courts should make a “specific determination about what 
portion (if any) of that pass-through income realistically and fairly 
is or should be deemed available to the shareholder for purposes of 
paying support.”43 
The Court next sought to determine whether the trial justice 
erred in excluding a $1,235,846 distribution from Century to Joel 
that was used to pay his “personal” income taxes.44  The Court 
again turned to J.S. and noted that, “[c]ourts in several 
jurisdictions have held that the portion of a distribution designated 
to pay taxes on earnings legitimately retained by the corporation is 
not available to a shareholder parent to satisfy a child support 
obligation.”45  
Next, the Court turned to Denise’s argument that the trial 
justice erroneously excluded Century distributions that were used 
to buy out Joel’s former partners and acquire sole ownership of 
41. Id. at 233.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 233–34 (quoting J.S. v. C.C., 912 N.E.2d 933, 941 (Mass. 2009)).
The court in J.S. went on to list relevant factors that should be considered in 
determining what portion of undistributed income may be available to a 
shareholder for child support obligations: (1) “the shareholder’s level of control 
over corporate distributions” as measured by his or her ownership interest; (2) 
“the legitimate business interests justifying” the decision to retain corporate 
earnings; and (3) whether there was “affirmative evidence of an attempt to 
shield income by means of retained earnings.”  J.S., 912 N.E.2d at 942–43.  
44. Trojan, 208 A.3d at 236.
45. Id. (quoting J.S., 912 N.E.2d at 944).
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Century.46  Denise argued that those distributions were used to pay 
what were essentially “personal debts,” and pointed to Joel’s 
testimony that he incurred a “personal debt” in the buyout, that he 
himself was paying down the debt to acquire a marital asset, and 
that Century was not obligated to pay the note.47  In addition to 
Joel’s testimony, Mr. Amico testified that the buyout debts were 
“outside the business,” and ultimately enhanced the value of the 
marital estate.48  The Court agreed with Denise and held that the 
Century “distributions used by Joel to satisfy his personal 
obligation in purchasing the sole ownership in Century should have 
been included in his gross income calculation to determine his child 
support obligation.”49  The Court reasoned that the Family Court 
administrative order defined gross income as “gross receipts minus 
ordinary and necessary expenses required for self-employment or 
business operation[,]” and ultimately Joel’s purchase of his 
partners’ shares was not an “ordinary and necessary expense[]” for 
Century.50  
The Court next addressed Denise’s argument that the trial 
justice erred when he excluded a $61,375 Century distribution that 
Joel used to pay an annual premium on a life insurance policy, to 
which Joel’s daughters, including Tiffany, were named 
beneficiaries.51  The Court agreed with Denise and held that the 
$61,375 should have been included in Joel’s gross income for the 
purpose of calculating child support obligations because “that 
distribution was used to satisfy a personal debt that Joel chose to 
take on himself.”52 
Lastly, the Court addressed Denise’s argument that the trial 
justice erred in excluding other “substantial financial perks” Joel 
enjoyed, including “luxury automobiles, car insurance, gasoline, 
country club memberships, cell phones, and other expenses that he 
46. Id. at 237.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.  “Joel testified that on January 1, 2012, Mr. Elliott sold his shares
to Joel” and his brother John for $2.5 million, of which Joel was responsible for 
$1.25 million.  Id.  Two years after the agreement with Mr. Elliott, Joel 
purchased John’s ownership shares in Century for $7.2 million, leaving Joel as 
the sole shareholder of Century.  Id.  
50. Id. at 239.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 240.
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financed through distributions from Century.”53 While the record 
reflected that evidence of those “perks” was presented during the 
divorce trial to calculate the marital estate, a settlement agreement 
was eventually reached, thus resolving any prior issues with 
respect to the marital estate.54  The only issues remaining 
subsequent to the settlement agreement were child support and 
medical, and therefore the Court held that by not raising the 
“substantial financial perks” issues at the September 28, 2016, 
child support hearing, Denise had waived those issues on appeal.55 
COMMENTARY 
The Court held that the trial justice correctly excluded 
Century’s 2015 net income and the 2015 Century distribution to 
pay income taxes from Joel’s gross income, but remanded the case 
to recalculate Joel’s gross income upon inclusion of the 2015 
Century distributions that were used to pay for stock buyouts and 
a life insurance policy.56  These “personal” debts are easily 
distinguishable from the requirement that Century increase its 
equity to $10 million in order to receive bonds.  While the Court’s 
reasoning is surely sound, it is somewhat contradictory in that, at 
least as it pertains to the life insurance policy, the distribution did 
not “inure to [Joel’s] benefit.”57  If anything, the life insurance 
policy, which named Tiffany as a beneficiary, was for Tiffany’s 
benefit.  Although it is easy to see why the Court held that Joel 
undertook this debt personally, and therefore the distribution that 
was used to pay for his personal debt should be included in his gross 
income to calculate his child support obligations, one could argue 
that the distribution was already supporting the child.  The Court, 
in deciding that the life insurance policy was “a personal debt that 
Joel chose to take on himself,” essentially categorizes the life 
insurance policy as an “[extra]ordinary and [un]necessary expense.” 
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 240–41.
56. Id. at 241.
57. See id. at 236.
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, for purposes of 
calculating Joel’s child support obligations, the “distributions used 
by Joel to satisfy his personal obligation in purchasing the sole 
ownership in Century should have been included in his gross 
income calculation to determine child support obligation,” and the 
distribution used to pay for Joel’s life insurance policy should have 
been included into his 2015 gross income.58  The case was remanded 
to the trial court to “recalculate the assets available to satisfy Joel’s 
child support obligation.”59  The Court made sure to point out that, 
after the trial justice recalculates Joel’s assets, the trial justice 
“may then deviate from the worksheet guidelines ‘only if he or she 
finds that the recommended child support order would be 
inequitable to the child or to either parent.’”60  In the end, the child 
support order must reflect “an amount reasonable or necessary for 
the child’s support[.]”61  After all, “no child, no matter how wealthy 
the parents, needs to be provided more than three ponies.”62 
Adam M. Harrington 
58. Id. at 237, 240.
59. Id. at 240.
60. Id. (quoting Vieira v. Hussein-Vieira, 150 A.3d 611, 618 (R.I. 2016)).
61. 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2(a).
62. Trojan, 208 A.3d at 236 (quoting Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449,
456 (Ky. App. Ct. 2001)). 
